Legal Realism Explains Nothing by D\u27Amato, Anthony
Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Working Papers
2010
Legal Realism Explains Nothing
Anthony D'Amato
Northwestern University School of Law, a-damato@law.northwestern.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Repository Citation




Legal Realism Explains Nothing, by Anthony D'Amato*  
1 Washington University Jurisprudence Review, 1-20 (2009) 
 
Abstract: I argue that American legal realism as derived from Oliver Wendell Holmes's prediction theory of law 
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[pg1] I.JUDICIAL FREEDOM VARIES INVERSELY WITH PERSONAL FREEDOM 
 
 I argue that American legal realism as derived from Oliver Wendell Holmes's prediction 
theory of law was misinterpreted, and that a deeper examination of law-as-prediction might help 
to reduce the pathology of judicial lawmaking that has been the unfortunate consequence of legal 
realism. 
  
 Legal realism is the theory that judges may decide cases by taking into account factors 
other than preexisting law.FN1 Judge Richard A. Posner recently extended the theory to its limits 
by announcing that there is no such thing as preexisting law: 
  
[L]aw is the activity of licensed persons, the judges, rather than a body of 
concepts (rules, principles, whatever).... The law is not a thing they discover; it is 
the name of their activity. They do not act in accordance with something called 
"law"—they just act as best they can.FN2 
 
 Like the Lord High Chancellor in IolantheFN3, Judge Posner embodies the law. Why are 
we not shocked by this grandiose claim? Perhaps it is because we have lost our collective 
memory of what it must have been like for people in the past to believe that law existed 
independently of judges. It is hard for us today to [pg2] think that law is anything other than 
what judges decide it to be. The judge's gavel signifies the brute finality of the court's 
determination of the law. One does not cavil with a gavel. 
 
 Yet a little over a hundred years ago the climate of opinion was exactly the opposite. 
Hardly anyone thought that judges made the law or were entitled to make it. Instead, law was 
believed to be a body of concepts (as Posner says) that judges had to study, understand, respect, 
and apply. Or as Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. later caricatured it, law was a "brooding 
omnipresence in the sky”FN4 Of course people back then knew that judges had the power to 
make final decisions, but they believed that judges were only functioning as law-appliers. Like 
umpires in a baseball game, judges could call the plays but could not change the rules. Judges 
could find the law but not make it. Since judges also believed that they were finding the law, the 
people were right. Courtroom lawyers invariably argued that law was an objective concept 
waiting to be found by the careful judge. 
 
 The idea that a judge could occasionally misapply the law was part of that climate of 
opinion. By contrast, Posner's notion of embodiment entails the impossibility of today's judge 
making a legal mistake—in the Wittgensteinian sense of the impossibility of being mistaken that 
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one is in pain. But in the mid-nineteenth century no one would have suggested that judges were 
incapable of error. A judicial mistake was considered a temporary aberration waiting to be 
corrected either by a higher court or by another judge in an analogous case. The gavel was not 
infallible. In fact, the popular as well as the academic belief that judges occasionally got the law 
wrong was the descendant of an even stricter tradition in the common law of England that 
allowed a losing party to sue the judge for making a decision that wrongfully and illegally 
deprived him of his property or rights. No judge in those formative days could credibly deny that 
other judges made mistakes of law. To shield themselves from personal liability for wrongful 
decisions, they instituted a new tribunal, the court of appeals, wherein the losing party had an 
automatic right to be heard on the sole issue of whether the trial judge had made a legal error. 
When we are reminded of those old views about law, they look decidedly naive. We pride 
ourselves on being legal realists.  
 
 [pg3] We can affirm with confidence that law itself had no greater corporeal existence a 
few centuries ago than it has today, namely, zero. Indeed, one might argue that the only 
difference between the old and modern views is psychological. Maybe nothing has changed 
except the way we describe the legal process. We may have only become more sophisticated, 
casting off "omnipresences"FN5 in the sky. Posner himself conceded in his eighth year on the 
bench that a judicial opinion, written in formal language and citing precedents, might be 
designed to give decisions "the pretense of certitude and neutrality.”FN6 He added that they 
might just be a way of "pulling the wool over the public's eyes.”FN7 
 
 However, the objection that changes in community conceptions of law are irrelevant is 
easily met. Granted law does not exist in the physical world; law is nothing but a shared mental 
construct. Because law is a construct, psychology is in the driver's seat. Law is what we 
(collectively) believe it to be. And if we go back one recursive step, we believe that law is what 
judges believe it to be. A judge who feels constrained by existing law is likely to be constrained 
by it. Although the constraint is only psychological, only psychological constraints can do any 
work at all when the decisional process is purely ideational. More pragmatically, the judge who 
finds law can be criticized by the legal community for failing to look hard enough or in the right 
place. As a result, the judge may improve her performance the next time around. In contrast, the 
judge who makes law cannot be criticized from a legal standpoint and is not likely to change his  
ways.FN8 
 
 The importance of psychological factors can be attested by judges' awareness of their 
own motivations (excluding of course the subconscious ones of which no one is aware). They 
may hear an internal whisper advising them to judge cases according to [pg4] preexisting law. 
Like Judge Posner, judges are free to overrule weak interior voices. Posner, as we have seen, 
declares that he does not act "in accordance with something called 'law".FN9 Although not all 
judges agree, or admit they agree, with Posner, prevailing judicial attitudes seem to be going in 
his direction. The Supreme Court itself increasingly seems to be acting like a super-legislature, 
which partly explains the microscopic (if tedious) attention now being paid to the policy 
preferences of the President's nominees to the Court. A century ago judges were not supposed to 
have policy preferences, and if judges had policy preferences they were forgotten as soon as they 




 Judge Posner's declaration of independence from the law self-confers upon him several 
degrees of freedom to decide cases as he wishes. He writes that "judges are not bound by the 
rules to do anything”FN10, implying that there is no cost to deciding cases without adhering to 
the rules. But although free-wheeling decision making may be costless to him, the real costs are 
externalized in a lessening of public confidence in the rule of law. Judicial freedom varies 
inversely with our personal freedom. On the one hand, if judges, unlike Posner, feel constrained 
by existing law, the web of law becomes more ascertainable. People obey the law because they 
know that an unforgiving judge is waiting at the end of the line to apply the law to them. On the 
other hand, when Posnerian judges feel unconstrained by existing law, then at the end of the line 
there is nothing but judicial whim. This whim feeds back to us in the form of the threat of 
punishment for obeying legal rules. For whenever a judge makes a new rule, the party who relied 
upon and obeyed an existing rule is punished. As more judges—especially appellate and 
Supreme Court judges—invent law under a sense of noblesse oblige to society (exclusive of the 
litigants), the more their activity tends to quash entrepreneurial spirit, diminish societal freedom, 
and undermine our faith in democratic institutions. It also encourages marginally illegal behavior 
by the police, who are the first to know when judges play fast and loose with the law. It tends to 
prematurely turn many law students into cynics. In the longer run, lawmaking degrades the 
judiciary as a whole and invites the public to regard judges as no better than dissembling 
politicians. 
 
 Freedom and law are most often complementary.  People [pg5] usually feel that they are 
better able to act freely when they know and can consider the legal sanctions to alternative 
courses of action. The state and its citizens are on the same side of the fence in this matter. The 
state wants people to conform their behavior to the rules the state itself has promulgated rather 
than to some other rule awaiting creation in a courtroom. And most people want to obey the law 
that the state has promulgated.FN11 Our personal freedom varies directly with the knowability 
and fixity of legal rules—at least until the rules themselves become too dense and overbearing. 
FN12 There are two prominent reasons that support a symbiosis between law and freedom. First, 
as already suggested, when we know or can learn what the legal rules are, and what punishments 
the state attaches to them, we are free to obey or disobey them depending on our calculation of 
the costs of incurring the prescribed punishment discounted by the likelihood of its being 
imposed.FN13
 
Second, the punishment attached to the rules is desirable from our collective 
standpoint because coercive rules are the best way to overcome free riding. The state once again 
is on our side. Since there are always enough people in any society who are sufficiently self-
serving to absorb the fruits of everyone else's cooperation, societies must resort to rules to 
promote socially altruistic behavior and make free riding prohibitively expensive. The stark 
alternative is anarchy. 
 
 The next part of this essay addresses the circumstances and effects of the remarkable turn 
in the public's attitude toward law. The tipping point was in 1897 when Holmes announced his  
 [pg6] prediction theory.FN14 I will argue that although Holmes's statement was misinterpreted, 
its received meaning ushered in a new movement called American legal realism. The enticement 
and simplicity of legal realism conquered the mind of the legal community, paving the way for 
judges to reconstitute themselves from being our law-applying servants into becoming our 
lawmaking masters. This reconstitution has eroded our freedom, even if the process has been too 




 There are two preliminary matters I would like to dispense with here. First, I am not 
making the standard democratic complaint that law-making has shifted from elected legislators 
to unelected judges. Rather, the distinction I wish to draw is between legal rules made prior to a 
person's conduct and those made ex post facto by judges. A judge who invents a rule and applies 
it retroactively to conduct that has already occurred seems to be engaging in a kind of reverse 
legislation. If in doing so the judge changes the law retroactively, then indeed it would be 
reverse-perverse legislation-penalizing a party for failure to obey a rule that the judge has just 
invented. But if the judge just finds the law as it existed when the facts of the case arose, then the 
judge is not making new law but only taking a picture of the old—the same picture the litigants 
could have taken when their case arose.FN15 
 
 Secondly, I am not arguing that judges are making too much law. Perhaps this is true of 
Supreme Court justices these days, but that's another story. The diminution of our personal 
freedom that I allege is not a function of the quantity of judge-made law but of the fact that 
judges feel free to make law at all. The person on the street may not notice the effect, but if a 
transaction involving her rights or property is litigated, she will notice it quickly enough. [pg7] 
She will find herself confronted with the possibility of significant loss simply for observing her 
civic obligation to respect the law that existed at the time of the transaction, a law that the judge 
has now seen fit to change. Behind her back the judge has turned her into a designated loser. 
 
 Part III of this essay is devoted to finding a reinterpretation of Holmes's theory. I will 
argue that its correct meaning is virtually unknown and rather strange. However we may derive 
some intellectual comfort by an analogy to prediction in quantum mechanics. 
 
 Finally, Part IV will show that the unusual interpretation of Holmes's prediction theory 
set forth in Part III can stand on its own footing as a sensible explanation of the nature of law. 
The four parts of the essay taken together then can be seen to offer a way to recapture the old 
virtue of regarding existing law as a limitation upon judicial freedom. 
 
II.  THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION OF HOLMES 
 
 We can pinpoint the time when the old conception of judges as law-finders began to 
morph into the modern conception of judges as lawmakers. Holmes announced what turned out 
to be a paradigm shift in a speech given in Boston in 1897: "[t]he prophecies of what the courts 
will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”FN16 The time 
element in Holmes's theory must have surprised those listeners who were paying close attention. 
For centuries up to 1897, lawyers, judges, scholars, and the general public viewed law as 
something that exists in the present-the time when people make decisions that are influenced by 
the content of the law. Holmes was now apparently informing everyone that law does not exist in 
the present. It only comes into existence in the future when courts issue their rulings-after people 
have relied on existing law in making their decisions. In the present we are remitted to guessing-
making prophecies-about what the law might turn out to be. This view of the matter corresponds 
with a standard view of probability theory that says that the number between zero and one that 




 When I first encountered Holmes's aphorism I interpreted it in the standard way. The 
image that came to mind was that of a meteorologist on television predicting a 75 percent chance 
of rain tomorrow. I later pictured an attorney advising her client that if he copies a movie on a 
DVD and gives it to his friend, he takes a 75 percent risk that a court will find him guilty of a 
copyright violation. (The attorney might add that if her client sells it to his friend, then the risk 
would go up to 85 percent.) This standard interpretation of Holmes is virtually the only 
interpretation that has ever been made. Later I will discuss a second possible interpretation. 
 
 Holmes's theory slowly but surely caught on with the practicing bar and the world of 
academia. Why would lawyers take readily to a theory that presupposed their ignorance of 
existing law? I suspect the answer is that they found that the theory would smooth their relations 
with clients. For instance, in the DVD copier case, the lawyer wants to avoid answering the 
client's question with an unqualified yes or no because doing so creates the possibility that the 
lawyer may be wrong. If so, the client will likely become angry at the lawyer, may become more 
likely to dispute the legal fees, may tell others not to hire this lawyer, and so forth. Instead, it is 
much less risky to tell the client that the law is unclear, and judges and juries are unpredictable, 
but there is a 75 percent chance that a judge (or jury) will find a copyright violation. That 
statement, in Karl Popper's terms, would be non-falsifiable.FN18
 
No matter the disposition of the 
DVD case, the lawyer can always tell her client that her 75 percent estimate was exactly right.  
In law schools, Holmes's paradigm had to await the retirement of two decades of traditionalist 
professors.FN19
 
Then, in the 1920s and 1930s, the enthusiasm of younger scholars for the 
possibilities opened up by the prediction theory led, to the [pg9] movement called legal realism. 
Its core idea was that if making prophecies of judicial decisions was the game lawyers played, 
then it was the professional duty of law schools to teach future lawyers how to improve their 
odds. Since judges can be motivated by ideas other than legal ideas, the curriculum ought to be 
expanded to include subjects other than the traditional ones. Why teach restitution, damages, 
bills and notes, and agency, when they can be replaced by courses in policy-making, social 
welfare, and statistics? If the goal is to turn out effective lawyers, then the curriculum should 
offer the complete gamut of subjects that might motivate judges.FN20 
 
 But far more important than the impact of legal realism upon attorneys and law 
professors was its psychological impact upon judges. Every judge in the United States was once 
a law student. A future judge, sitting in a classroom in the 1920s or 1930s, might have 
experienced a rush of empowerment upon realizing that all his classmates were studying the law 
in the hopes that someday they might influence him. Better yet, once he became a judge, he 
would not have to pay much attention to what the lawyers said about the law (any more than he 
did in the classroom). For the "law" would be whatever he proclaims it to be. 
 
 Because professors knew that some of their students would become judges, their decision 
to offer peripheral subjects served to legitimize those offerings. Thus a course in social policy, 
which before legal realism would have been deemed irrelevant to studying law, became relevant 
because future judges would look back on their legal training and assume that social policy was 
part of the law. Thus legal realism in the curriculum became a self-fulfilling prophecy—not the 




 More generally, the most dangerous side-effect of legal realism has been its own process 
of normalization. Many of those future judges sitting in law school classrooms learned that legal 
realism itself is part of their job description. Thus, on ascending the bench, they need not regard 
themselves as being constrained by the law as found in the law books, for the law as now 
properly understood encompasses every area of human endeavor-from [pg10] literature to 
linguistics, from Darwinism to deconstruction, from judicial activism to judicial laziness. Judge 
Posner, himself the product of a Harvard Law School faculty then dominated by legal realists, 
tells us that what today's judges seek above everything—given that they are not remunerated 
according to the quantity or quality of their work—is the maximization of their own leisure-
serving interests.FN21 
 
III.  THE UNUSUAL INTERPRETATION 
 
 The standard interpretation of Holmes, as we have seen, tells us that in the present we are 
ignorant of the law. If we go to a lawyer for help, the best the lawyer can do for us is to guess 
what the law may turn out to be once it comes before a judge. There is nothing to stop a judge 
from inventing new rules and retroactively applying them to us so that we lose the case. 
 
 But there is a second possible interpretation of Holmes. Consider his exact words: "The 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by 
the Removing the superfluous clause we have: the prophecies of what the courts will do in fact 
are what I mean by the law.”FN22 However, the standard interpretation asks us to ignore the 
opening words of the sentence, as if we had: what the courts will do in fact [is] what I mean by 
the law. But why should we ignore the prophecy clause? Holmes led with it. Indeed, the word 
"prophecies" may have been chosen instead of "predictions" to call attention to itself; Holmes 
actually used the word "predictions" at other places in the same speech. So we know that his 
choice was deliberate. Was he really trying to tell his audience that they can never know what the 
law is at the time they need to act upon it? 
 
 It is more likely that Holmes was reducing his audience's expectations. He was looking 
for a meaning of "law" that would speak to the present. We may take him as asserting three 
propositions [FN23]: 
 
1. the prophecies exist in the present;  
2. the prophecies are determinable;  
3. the law is nothing but the prophecies.  
 
 [pg11] People act on present prophecies, whether they are their own prophecies (as in 
deciding to go through a red light when it seems stuck) or the predictions of an attorney. Any 
prophecy above 50 percent signifies illegality. When the attorney advised the client about 
copying the DVD, the prophecy of a 75 percent chance of illegality, translated into ordinary 
English, means that it would be illegal—at the present time and knowing everything we can 





 Although the foregoing considerations may call for rejecting the standard interpretation 
of Holmes, an apparently insuperable difficulty intrudes. This difficulty is best illustrated by the 
case of a meteorologist forecasting tomorrow's weather. It is clear that the forecast is not itself 
the weather, it is only a prediction of the weather. By the same token we can say that a lawyer's 
prediction is not itself the law but only a prophecy of what the law will be. The analogy between 
forecaster and solicitor seems to support the standard interpretation. 
 
 But sometimes a striking analogy is the most misleading kind. We may need a quite 
different one. We need a situation where the focal point of interest is the prediction itself and not 
the eventuality predicted by the prediction. The only exampleFN25
 
of which I am aware is in the 
field of quantum mechanics. I believe it is an analogy powerful enough to cast additional light on 
legal realism. 
  
 We may begin with the familiar idea that electrons, photons, and other subatomic entities 
are neither particles nor waves, but [pg12] some unimaginable combination of both. Schrodinger 
described an electron as following a wave function. Picture an ordinary bell curve: the curve 
represents the probable path of an electron according to Schrodinger. If a measurement of the 
electron is actually made—on a photographic plate or in a Wilson cloud chamber—then the 
electron will show up as a particle. The height (or amplitude) of the wave represents the 
probability of finding all electron at the point where the height is measured. Thus the electron is 
more likely to show up at the peak of the bell curve than in either of its tails (which theoretically 
stretch out across the universe).FN26  
 
 However, quantum theory tells us that when we make a measurement of the electron, the 
measurement itself interferes with the electron. The reason is that the measuring instrument has 
to consist of a probe on the same scale as the electron it is measuring-for example, a photon of 
light or another electron on the photographic plate. As we measure our target electron, the probe 
interacts with the target, displacing it. This is one way to state Heisenberg's uncertainty 
principle.FN27 It tells us that we can never know where an electron is right now. The best we 
can do is use the Schrodinger equation to predict where the electron might show up if we 
conduct a measurement. 
  
 But Max Born, one of the founders of quantum mechanics, thought it absurd to say that 
we can only guess where an electron might be at the present moment by relying upon a 
measurement that has not yet taken place.FN28 Instead, he urged physicists to assume that where 
the electron is located right now is the correct starting point for analysis. In fact, we have a 
picture of where the electron is right now-Schrodinger's wave function. Born renamed it a 
probability wave.FN29
 
The true picture of the electron in the present is that it is nothing but a 
wave of probability. A common figure of speech is that the electron is smeared out all [pg13] 
along the probability wave. When the wave is disturbed by a measuring probe, the wave function 
collapses and we find the electron in the form of a particle. But its particle form only represents 
where the electron is by virtue of its being jarred as a result of the measurement. Right before a 
measurement the only form any electron has is a wave of probability. 
 
 But how could the probability wave itself be the electron? This question, which is 
analogous to the question of how a prophecy can itself be the law, greatly troubled Einstein. In 
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1935, the heyday of American legal realism in law schools, Einstein was coincidentally 
promoting the cause of physical realism. He and two associates wrote an influential paper 
opposing Born's interpretation.FN30
 
According to Einstein, the building blocks of the universe 
are material things, not probabilities.FN31 (The legal realists at the same time were saying that 
law was what courts in fact do, not prophecies.) Einstein argued that there must be reasons that 
account for the strange behavior of quantum entities other than those presented in the classic 
texts of quantum theory by Bohr, Heisenberg, Born, Schrodinger, De Broglie, Dirac, and 
Einstein himself.FN32
 
(Similarly the American legal realists at that time were arguing that there 
must be reasons that account for judicial behavior other than the law on the books.) Einstein 
proposed an experiment that could falsify the proposition that electrons and other subatomic 
particles were just probabilities. He took advantage of a well-known phenomenon about 'paired 
electrons'—that if two electrons A and B are paired together in an AB combination, they will act 
as a unit even after they are divided by an electron splitter and go their separate ways.FN33 Thus 
if A originally had a clockwise spin, it would retain its clockwise [pg14] spin after being 
separated from B; while B, which by virtue of its having been being paired with A originally had 
a counterclockwise spin, would retain its counterclockwise spin after it was separated from A. 
FN34 Inasmuch as Heisenberg had demonstrated the impossibility of knowing any of two 
conjugate variables of an elementary particle—in this case, of knowing both the location and the 
spin of a single electron—Einstein proposed two measurements to be taken after the electrons 
were separated by the splitter. The first would be the measurement of A's spin, the second would 
measure B's position. Measuring A's spin would then reveal B's spin by logical implication, since 
B's spin will be the opposite of A's. Then we combine our inferential knowledge of B's spin with 
the measurement we actually made of B's position. The bottom line is that we would presumably 
know B's spin as well as its location. This knowledge was what Heisenberg said was impossible 
to attain. It would be blocked by the uncertainty principle. 
 
 By 1935, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle had been confirmed by hundreds of 
experiments and never disconfirmed. Einstein was not one to refute an experimental finding for 
the sake of a theory, even his own. Accordingly, when A's spin is measured, Einstein accepted 
the fact that B's spin must undergo a random change. This would be true even if at the moment 
of simultaneous measurement A is on Earth and B is four light-years away on Alpha Centuri. 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle would thus be confirmed, but at the cost of assuming some 
kind of instantaneous communication between A and B—what has been called "spooky action at 
a distance.’’FN35 To avoid instantaneous communication (which moreover would require the 
message's speed to be faster than light-in violation of Einstein's own special theory of relativity), 
Einstein proposed the existence of hidden variables unknown to quantum experimentation that 
would account for the strange results of the experiment.FN36 These hidden variables, later 
worked out mathematically by David [pg15] BohmFN37, would explain the strange results of the 
quantum experiments. (Similarly the legal realists at the time were in effect arguing that there 
were hidden variables—variables other than the law on the books-that affected judicial decision-
making.) 
 
 Although Einstein died without retracting his insistence on physical realism, Alain 
Aspect subsequently proved that there were no hidden variables and there could not possibly be 
any.FN38 We now know for certain that the building blocks of the universe have a probabilistic 
9 
 
existence.FN39 The material objects that we see and touch in our macroworld appear solid only 
because they consist of vast and dense aggregations of probabilities. 
 
 The foregoing analogy with physical realism in quantum theory should assist us in 
conceiving of law as having a probabilistic existence. Whatever degree of probability law has, it 
must exist in the present—at t1. The judge's later measurement at t2 should not affect what the 
law was at t1. The idea of presentism may be referenced in support of this worldview. 
Philosophical presentists hold that the only reality in the universe is the one we experience at the 
present slice of time.FN40 Everything happens in the present and nothing happens in the past or 
in the future.FN41 Presentists would probably criticize as incoherent the realist's idea that a law 
must be obeyed when its existence or nonexistence can only be guessed at. FN42 
 
 
However, the analogy with quantum mechanics should not be pushed too far. A vital 
difference is that in the quantum world a [pg16] measurement of electron A will invariably 
randomize the behavior of its twin B even if, as recent experiments have shown, A's 
measurement is made after B's behavior is randomized.FN43 Although quantum mechanics is 
probabilistic, the aggregate probabilities can be measured accurately because the physical world 
is deterministic. By contrast, law proceeds on the assumption of free will. A judge's 
measurement of the law after the fact need not necessarily change the prior law. It all depends on 
how the judge at t2 chooses to measure the law at t1. 
 
 It is possible—indeed, it was classically expected—that a judge at t2 would simply 
interpret (measure) the law as it existed on the books at t1 and put aside other considerations such 
as his own preferences. This neutral reading of the law (unlike a quantum probe) would not 
affect its content. To be sure, the judge's reading at t2 might be a more informed interpretation of 
the law than either contesting attorneys were able to reach at tl, due to the fact that the judge at t2 
will have had the research benefit of both attorneys' briefs and oral arguments. But although the 
judge at t2 can take a sharper picture of the law as it was at t1 without interfering with it, the 
critical commonality is that the judge and attorneys are looking at the same texts (the texts extant 
at t1) with enough mental discipline, we assume, to avoid [pg17] contaminating their reading by 
wishful thinking, post-event information, or idiosyncratic preferences.  
 
 On the other hand, the judge at t2 who regards himself as a legal realist may change the 
law as it was at t1 by inventing new law. How does he pull off this feat of retroactive 
legerdemain? The well-worn legal phrase provides the answer: "by operation of law.”FN44 The 
judge's opinion at t2 "relates back" to t1 by operation of law, changing the law as it used to be at 
t1.  
 
 The winning party of course will not protest this magical kind of retroactivity, but the 
loser would have every reason to complain. His complaint, however, will be deflected with the 
judiciary's standard defense mechanism: "there's always one party in every case who is 
disappointed." The judge's law clerks will have been clever enough to dress up the judge's 
opinion so that it looks as if it was ordained by prior law. Few judges other than Posner in his 
books (and not even him in his opinions) will ever admit they change the law retroactively. They 
cannot quite bring themselves to say that they are making new law—legal realism's victory over 
the public mind has not yet been quite that complete. A realist judge may rationalize that he is a 
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silent hero who is improving the law for the general welfare of society even if professional 
ground rules prohibit him from disclosing that fact in his opinions. It is clear from Posner's many 
books that the one constraint that he regards as binding is the requirement of acting in the highest 
tradition of the judiciary. The question is whether he regards respect for existing law as part of 
that tradition. "Greatness in law implies the transcending of law," he writes.FN45
 
If everyone in 
the country except the losing litigant benefits from the judge's change in a legal rule, then a judge 
with utilitarian convictions like Posner's may believe that he has rendered unto society a noble 
service. 
 
IV.  SUMMARY: LAW AS PROBABILITY 
  
 So far what I have tried to show can be restated in the following progression: [pg18] 
 
 1. The state's interest in controlling, influencing, or channeling the behavior of its citizens 
is operationalized by promulgating rules that are designed to influence the citizens at the moment 
of their decision to act or refrain from acting.  
 2. In promulgating its rules, the state makes an implicit yet fundamental contract with its 
citizens: it promises not to punish citizens who obey its rules, but also promises to punish 
citizens who disobey its rules.  
 3. In order for the state's promises to be credible, the state must guarantee their 
observance by every official in the state including judges and police officers.  
 4. In order for the state's rules to be effective, they must be known to, or ascertainable by, 
every citizen at his or her decisional moment.  
 5. No state official is standing by, at the decisional moment, to explain exactly what the 
state wants a citizen to do.  
 6. Thus at the decisional moment the citizen's only option is to predict what the state will 
do.  
 7. The citizen is entitled to base her prediction on existing law, for the state has promised 
(see paragraph 2 above) that it will enforce rules that are in existence at the citizen's decisional 
moment (see paragraph 1 above).  
 8. A judge who reviews the citizen's decision ex post is bound by the state's promise (see 
paragraph 2 above) to apply the law as it existed at the decisional moment. 
 
 Accordingly, a judge would be breaking the state's promise if he changes the law after the 
citizen makes her decision. To be sure, the judge would presumably only change the law if he 
thought that the existing law was unwise or not in the best interests of society. But the citizen 
who complied with that law may have done so despite her own belief that the law was unwise or 
not in the best interests of society. It would be lawless for a judge now to punish her. Although 
the judge may' desire to "transcend the law," as Posner suggests, the citizen at the time she relied 
on the law would have been courting punishment if she had risked transcending it. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 To quote Holmes one last time: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and 
nothing more pretentious, are what I [pg19] mean by the law.”FN46 The law is the prophecies. 
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What the courts "will do in fact" is what they are supposed to do as lawful agents of the state, 
namely, to fulfill those prophecies. 
 
 The judge who finds it more interesting to invent new law rather than restate the old is 
stealthily undermining public confidence in the rule of law and narrowing the ambit of personal 
freedom. He is acting as a legislator, not a judge—a legislator of the worst sort, who enacts new 
law and holds it against innocent people who were dutifully complying with the old law. If the 
judge in addition believes that he embodies the law, he is saying that, if the public wants to 
understand the law, they should study him. For in the end he has no theory of law. He cannot 
explain what the law is; he can only say that law is what he does—but he does not say that it is a 
shortcoming on his part that he cannot explain what the law is. Instead it is a failing on the law's 
part! Law, to the realist judge, is intrinsically inexplicable. Thus legal realism explains nothing. 
 
 Legal realism is self-defeating in advocacy. To take a fanciful example that proves the 
point, suppose an attorney in arguing to a court states that a team of his investigators has been 
observing the presiding judge every morning. The judge walks out of his downtown apartment 
and stops for a quick breakfast either at McDonald's or at Dunkin' Donuts. On McDonald's days 
his decisions favor the plaintiff 84 percent of the time. On Dunkin' days, his decisions favor the 
defendant 90 percent of the time. The attorney then argues that since he is representing the 
plaintiff, and since the judge this morning breakfasted at McDonald's, sound principles of 
statistical sociology require the judge to decide the case in favor of his client. We can well 
imagine a judge's reaction to this argument: first, thirty days in jail for contempt of court in 
spying on a judge's private life, and second, decision for the defendant because the plaintiff’s 
lawyer doesn't know the difference between a legal argument and a cup of coffee.  
 
 If law professors started the movement of legal realism, they should be the first to 
disavow it along with its debilitating effect upon the judiciary's perception of the law. This essay 
has shown that legal realism was founded on a mistake, one that can be corrected by 
reinterpreting Holmes's prediction theory. All the [pg20] implications of that mistake can, and 
should, be reversed. There is deep psychological wisdom in the classic view that law has an 
independent existence outside the courtroom. Courts need to respect the law by trying, with each 
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